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I. Introduction 
In rapidly growing numbers, business firms are committing 
to meet environmental standards set by nongovernmental 
environmental certification programs. Such programs claim 
to harness the incentives of the market to promote the public 
interest. Th�y typically define the environmental standards 
that firms must meet and establish organizational mecha­
nisms for achieving and "certifying" compliance. De­
pending on the program, firms are entitled to signal their 
certification status by displaying labels on their literature, 
facilities, or products. Examples of important environmen­
tal certification programs include the Forest Stewardship 
Council's (FSC's) well-managed forests program,2 the In­
ternational Organization for Standardization (ISO) 14001 
environmental management program,3 and the chemical in­
dustry's Responsible Care® program. 4
Although environmental certification programs have 
immense potential to reshape environmental management 
practices and their affiliated legal rights and duties, Ameri­
can environmental lawyers have largely ignored them. It is 
difficult to say why. Perhaps they assume from decades of 
experience that important environmental mandates neces­
sarily come from governments. Perhaps they are constitu-
http://www.efi.fi/publications!Discussion_Papers!Ol. pdf(last visited Nov. 
28, 2000), or Errol Meidinger, "Private" Environmental Regulation, 
Human Rights, and Community, 6 BuFF. ENVTLL.J. 132 (1999), available 
at http:/lwww.law.buffulo.edu/homepage/eemeidlscholarshiplhrec. pdf (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2000) [hereinafter Private Environmental Regulation]. 
There are numerous other private enviromnental certification programs. 
Many of the older ones concentrate on food labeling, particularly in 
Europe. Many of the newer ones focus on particular sectors of 
enviromnental management, such as forestry, fishing, chemical 
production, and so on. 
3. See ISO and the Environment, at http:/ /www.iso.ch/9000e/isoanden. 
htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2000). For general overviews, see Bass, supra 
note 2; Private Environmental Regulation, supra note 2. 
4. The American Responsible Care® program is described at American 
Chemistry Council, Good Chemistry, at http://www.cmahq.com (last 
visited Nov. 27, 2000). The Canadian program-the first in the 
world-can be found at Voluntary Codes-Executive Summaries, at 
http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/ca00797e.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2000). 
For a general overview, see Neil Gunningham, Environment, 
Self-Regulation, and the Chemica/Industry: Assessing Responsible Care, 
17 LAw & PoL'Y 57 (1995). 
• ' 
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tionally different from corporate and securities lawyers, 
who, over the years, have made much more extensive use of 
nongovernmental ordering mechanisms. In any event, the 
nearly exclusive focus of American environmental lawyers 
on government mandates is increasingly anachronistic, 
given the apparent incapacity of legislatures to seriously re­
assess existing laws and the sluggishness of administrative 
agencies in restructuring regulatory frameworks. 
This Article argues that environmental certification 
programs are likely to become important engines of change 
in American environmental law, and that they deserve the 
serious attention of environmental lawyers. Section II de­
scribes common features of environmental certification 
programs to date, and compares them to governmental le­
gal systems. Sections III and IV review areas of law likely 
to be implicated by certification programs, and describe 
how they may relate to certification. Section V offers 
some concluding thoughts about the implications of cer­
tification programs. 
II. Environmental Certification Programs5 
A. Standard Setting 
Environmental certification programs seek to verify for a 
broader public6 that the activities of certified enterprises are 
environmentally appropriate. Of course, the first rub comes 
in defining "appropriate." Certification programs follow 
two basic approaches. In the first, the certification program 
sets substantive performance standards to be met by all cer­
tified firms. The FSC, for example, requires that "forest 
management shall conserve biological diversity and its as­
sociated values, water resources, soils, and unique and frag­
ile ecosystems and landscapes, and, by so doing, maintain 
the ecological functions and the integrity of the forest." This 
requirement is further defined in national and regional stan­
dards, which establish concrete criteria and indicators for 
compliance. 7 FSC certification also requires firms to respect 
applicable environmental laws, protect the well-being of 
workers and communities, and so on.8 The FSC's primary 
S. This paper occasionally substitutes the term "certification system" 
for "certification program." While the term "program" typically refers to a 
specific, operating organization, the term "system" refers to its more 
abstract structure of actors and their relationships, often extending well 
beyond the organization. Many certification programs are based in 
industry or trade groups, thereby falling into the "self-regulation" 
category as developed by much scholarship on regulatory institutions 
(e.g., IAN AYREs & JoHN BRAI1HWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATioN: 
TRANsCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); Margot Priest, The 
Privatization of Regulation: Five Models of Self-Regulation, 29 0ITAWA 
L. REv. 233 (1997-1998)). Many of the newer and most innovative 
programs, however, are based on nongovernmental organizations or 
technical standard-setting organizations. 
6. The question of what "public" is the intended audience is often quite 
important to the operation of a certification program, but cannot be gone 
into here. Potential audiences include environmental activists, cQnsumers, 
intermediate manufacturers or retailers, local communities, and society a8 
a whole. For a brief discussion of the roles audiences can play in 
certification dynamics, see Benjamin Cashore, Legitimacy and the 
Privatization of Environmental Governance: Exploring Forest 
Certification (Eco-Labeling) in the U.S. and Canadian Forest Sectors, 
GoVERNANCE J. (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 8-1 0) (copy on file 
with author). 
competitor in the United States, the American Forest & Pa­
per Association's ( AF&PA's) Sustainable Forestry Initia­
tive (SFI), has set substantive environmental standards that 
mimic the FSC's to some extent, but are more favorable to 
industrial forest management. The SFI program does not at­
tempt to integrate social justice concerns. 9 
The second approach to certification is essentially 
procedural, requiring firms to implement environmental 
management systems (EMSs) with defined responsibility 
structures for planning, operations, monitoring, corrective 
action, and so on. Thus, firms may set their own substantive 
standards, but are required to institute organizational mech­
anisms for achieving them. The cardinal example is the ISO 
14001 program. Its motor is the "continuous improvement" 
requirement.10 The underlying assumption is that dynamic 
EMSs will achieve superior environmental performance 
over time, while facilitating greater efficiency and adapt­
ability than substantive standards. It is of course possible to 
combine substantive and procedural approaches, and many 
systems do so to some extent. The FSC, for example, has a 
modest EMS requirement, 11 and the Canadian Standards 
Association places heavy stress on the EMS while incorpo­
rating modest substantive standards.12 
Certification programs generally have formal ar­
rangements for setting and revising standards. Programs 
sponsored by industry associations tend simply to employ 
the general decision procedures of the associations. Other 
programs, such as the ISO and the FSC, have much more 
elaborate arrangements. The FSC, for example, has a consti­
tutional structure with an international "general assembly" 
representing economic, environmental, and social interests 
in equal proportions, and giving northern (developed) and 
southern (developing) societies equal voting power within 
each interest.13 It also provides for national and regional leg­
islative bodies to define place-based forest management 
standards and criteria, which become applicable on ap­
proval by the United Nations General Assembly. The cen­
tral and regional legislative bodies have promulgated a large 
number of rules governing forest management, its evalua-
7. See Appendix. 
8. The effort to integrate environmental, economic, and social justice 
criteria in the same standard is of course highly ambitious, perhaps more 
so than most governmental regulatory programs. For an analysis of how 
the FSC pursues the trilateral agenda, see Private Environmental 
Regulation, supra note 2. 
9. See generally Sustainable Forestry Initiative Program, at 
http://www.afandpa.org/forestry/forestry.html (last visited Nov. 28, 
2000). See also Private Environmental Regulation, supra note 2. 
10. See ISO, INTERNATIONAL STANDARD 14001, ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS-SPECIFICATION WITH GuiDANCE FOR UsE 
§4.2. 
11. Private Environmental Regulation, supra note 2. 
12. See Chris Elliott, Forest Certification: Analysis From a Policy 
Network Perspective 308-9 (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Ecole 
Polytechnique Federate de Lausanne) (on file with author). 
13. For a thorough description of the FSC structure, see Private 
Environmental Regulation, supra note 2. 
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tion, and certification, which closely resemble what legal 
scholars would ordinarily call legislation. 14 
Finally, it is important to note that the standards pro­
mulgated by different certification systems interact. Some­
times systems simply borrow good ideas from one another. 
Often, however, they design standards strategically to com­
pete with each other. Their competitive strategies appear de­
signed, among other things, to attract new adherents, to 
blunt the attractiveness of other programs, and to define 
master sochil metaphors, such as ecosystem health, 
sustainability, and corporate responsibility. 1•5 The standards 
must be understood, therefore, as participating in a larger 
social dialogue regarding standards for acceptable and un­
acceptable behavior. 
B. Adjudication and Enforcement 
As the broad popularity ofEMSs suggests, certification pro­
grams put considerable stress on implementation mecha­
nisms. There is broad agreement among programs that inter­
nal organizational controls are necessary for firms to 
achieve and maintain compliance. There is much conten­
tion, however, about what kinds of external mechanisms are 
necessary. The FSC has generally taken the lead with the po­
sition that independent, third-party auditors are essential. 
The ISO imposes a similar requirement for 14001 registra­
tion. Industry groups such as the AF&PA and the Chemical 
Manufacturers Association have resisted the idea, arguing 
that a firm's commitment to meet the standard should be suf­
ficient. Over time, industry programs seem to be retreating, 
recognizing that self-certification suffers from inherently 
limited public credibility. The AF&PA, for example, re­
cently instituted a "voluntary verification" program, in 
which member firms may arrange for audits by third-party 
verifiers if they wish. 16 
The growth ofenvironmental certification programs 
has spawned a growing profession of third-party environ­
mental certifiers, many of whom conduct certifications un­
der a variety of systems. These certifiers seem to draw their 
14. FSC Website, supra note 2. Much but not all of FSC legislation is 
applicable to forest management. Some of it also defines how the various 
bodies in the FSC system are to operate, as would be the case with 
governmental legislation. Edward Rubin, Law and Legislation in the 
Administrative State, 89 CoLUM. L. REV. 369, 374 (1989). 
15. As in business competition, certification programs also enjoy 
strategic possibilities for cooperative agreements, alliances, mergers, and 
so on. One ongoing discussion, ordinarily regarding certification 
programs in the same sector, concerns "mutual recognition" of one 
program by another. Only a few examples have occurred to date, but many 
more seem possible. Multi-country certification alliances are also 
occurring, as is being demonstrated by the creation of the 14-nation Pan 
European Forest Certification Council. See Pan European Forest 
Certification Website, athttp://www.pefc.org (last visited Nov. 28, 2000). 
Cross-sector alliances among certification programs are also emerging. 
One of the most intriguing is the International Social and Environmental 
Accreditation and Labeling Alliance (ISEAL), which includes the 
Conservation Agriculture Network, Fairtrade Labeling Organizations, 
FSC, International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements, 
International Organic Accreditation System, and Social Accountability 
International, which are seeking to coordinate their standard-setting and 
enforcement strategies. Presentation by James Sullivan and Pat Mallet, 
Forest Stewardship Council Annual Meeting, Oaxaca, Mexico, Nov. 11, 
2000, available at http://www.isealalliance.org (visited Oct. 25, 2000). 
value from a combination of professional expertise, experi­
ence with a broad variety of certification cases, and careful 
justification of their decisions under applicable standards. 
Viewed from one angle, although they would undoubtedly 
resist this characterization, certifiers can be seen as 21st cen­
tury analogues to the itinerant justices sent out by ancient 
English monarchs to ensure that affairs on the land were 
conducted as expected.17 From a more prosaic perspective, 
they can be viewed as independent contractors performing 
adjudication and enforcement functions quite comparable 
to those of modern administrative law judges.18 
Perhaps the most striking difference between 
certifiers and administrative law judges is that certifiers are 
generally paid by the firms being certified, rather than by 
government. Their independence and objectivity are thus 
continually subject to challenge. Given this vulnerability, it 
is interesting that environmental certification systems have 
not adopted what appears to be the most important mecha­
nism for protecting the legitimacy of government regulatory 
agencies in the modem era: public access to information. To 
date, environmental certification programs have asserted 
that their labels fulfill all legitimate public information re­
quirements. Pressures for greater information-sharing and 
transparency are growing, however, and certification pro­
grams seem likely to respond to them over time. 
C. Certification Systems and Legal Systems 
With their standard-setting, adjudication, and enforcement 
mechanisms, certification programs bear a striking resem­
blance to government regulatory programs. Yet, because of 
their apparently autonomous and voluntary nature, certifi­
cation programs are often conceptualized as ''unilateral 
16. See Statement of Expert Review Panel Chairman Paul Hansen,l999 
5th Annual Progress Report, AF&PA Sustainable Forestry Initiative 2, 
available at http://www.afandpa.org/forestry/forestry.html (last visited 
Nov. 28, 2000). 
17. See, e.g., S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FoUNDATIONS OF THE 
COMMON LAW 25-36 (2d ed. 1981). 
18. The certifiers act as adjudicators in that they are charged with 
determining whether applicants for certification meet the various 
ecological, operational, economic, and social criteria. Certifiers also aetas 
enforcers. In the FSC system, for example, they are charged with on-going 
monitoring of firms that receive certification, and can revoke certificates if 
forest management falls below set standards. As in many regulatory 
regimes, considerable responsibility for collecting information and 
reporting on compliance falls to regulated firms. FSC certifiers also 
exercise a great deal of discretion and judgment in determining whether 
individual forest management operations meet the standards for 
certification. This is due to both the inherent complexity of forest 
management and the multiple environmental, social, and economic goals 
of the certification regime. As is often the case with government agencies, 
many certification pr«;lgrams have standards and procedures for 
accrediting the certifiers who determine whether management practices 
meet their standards. 
2-2001 NEWS & ANALYSIS 31 ELR 10165 
commitment"19 programs separate and distinct from legal 
systems. In fact, however, certification programs are both 
similar to and deeply intertwined with traditional legal sys­
tems. In addition to using law to organize themselves and 
control their members, certification programs also rely on 
the fear of intensified legal regulation to attract participants. 
Perhaps more importantly, certification programs can have 
a significant influence on the content and implementation 
of legal mandates. This influence is likely in turn to 
prompt legal systems to seek ways of influencing or regu­
lating certification systems. In tracing the paths and 
forms that such interactions are likely to take, it is helpful 
to start by comparing the basic eleJ;llents of legal systems 
and certification systems. 
· 
1. Legal Systems 
Of course, the definitions of"law" and "legal system" have 
been much disputed over the years, and will not be resolved 
here. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that there is 
. widespread acceptance that legal systems have the follow­
ing features20: 
(1) Legislative bodies, often representing de­
fined interests, make rules governing actors within 
their jurisdiction. 
(2) Adjudicative bodies determine the applicability of 
rules in particular cases. In doing so they often give fur­
ther definition to rules. 
(3) Enforcement bodies 
(a) gather information on compliance with rules, 
and 
(b) use sanctions (punishments and rewards), to 
promote compliance. 
( 4) The legal bodies operate under rules, ordinarily 
governing both their composition and procedures, which 
often include opportunities for pubHc participation. 
(5) Actions taken by legal bodies are not fully deter-
19. This categorization reflects the work of the Concerted Action on 
Voluntary Approaches (CAVA) project, a European Union-supported 
effort to develop a research network and a body of research on the use of 
''voluntary approaches" to improve environmental management. CAVA: 
Concerted Action on Voluntary Approaches, at http://www.ensmp.fr/Fr/ 
CERNNCERNA/Progeuropeens/CA V Allndex.html (last visited Nov. 
25, 2000). See Steven Baeke et al., The Nature of Voluntary Approaches: 
Empirical Evidence and Patterns: Literature Survey, CAVA Working 
Paper No. 99/08/3, August 1999; ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC 
CoOPERATION & DEV., VOLUNTARY APPROACHES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
PoLICY: AN AssESsMENT ( 1999). Certification systems are a special kind 
of unilateral commitment program, since they do not claim to be "one 
shof' efforts, but rather set up frameworks for long-term policy 
development and implementation. 
20. See, e.g., JosEPH RAZ, THE CoNCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF LEGAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1980). 
Although western legal terms such as legislation and adjudication are used 
here, these terms need not be used within legal systems. The key idea is 
that legal systems have ways of formulating rules, determining their 
applicability, applying sanctions, and so on. ..... 
21. The amount of discretion, however, may often look larger when 
viewed from the perspective of rules than when viewed within a social 
context including cultural assumptions, shared operating procedures, and 
the like. See, e.g .• Errol Meidinger, Regulatory Culture: A Theoretical 
Outline, 9 LAw & PoL 'y 355 ( 1987); Edward L. Rubin, Discretion and Its 
Discontents, 72 CHr.-KENT L. REv. 1299 (1997). 
22. See, e.g., H1-Ns KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND THE STATE 
mined by rules; they also involve the exercise of judg­
ment and discretion.21 
(6) Sovereign states provide the primary authority and 
implementation mechanisms, largely financed by taxes. 
The last criterion is maintained by many,22 but not 
all23 legal theorists. It has long faced problems regarding 
how democratic a state must be for its rules to qualify as 
law. 24 More recently, the growth of a global order transcend­
ing individual states yet enacting rules that operate like laws 
has created problems for this conception. 25 These issues re­
ceive further attention in the conclusion of this Article. 
2. Certification Systems 
Although there is no uniform definition of a certification 
system, and existing programs that are classified as certifi­
cation systems vary considerably, most systems include the 
following elements: 
(1) Standard setting bodies operating with defined 
membership and decision processes. These can be sec­
tor-specific industry groups (e.g., the Chemical Manu­
facturers Association), general industrial standard set­
ting federations (e.g., the IS0),26 or multi-interest stake­
holder groups (e.g, the FSC). 
(2) �tandards for certification, 
(a) These follow either or both of two gen­
eral approaches: 
(i) Substantive performance standards (the 
FSC approach); 
(ii) Environmental management system stan­
dards (the ISO approach); 
(b) Certification can attach to an enterprise, a prod­
uct, or both, depending on the program. 
(3) Organizational mechanisms for certifying compli­
ance of individual firms with applicable standards, 
which center on:. 
(a) Information systems maintained by firms 
(b) Professional certifiers exercising considerable 
(1945). Kelsen,like most western legal theorists of the late 19th and 20th 
centuries, argued that law must involve a threat of punishment by the state. 
23. See, e.g., fRIEDRICH CHARLES VON SA VIGNY, OF THE VOCATION OF 
OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE (Abraham Hayward 
trans., Arno Press 1975) (1831). Savigny argued that law "is first 
developed by custom . . .  next by jurisprudence-everywhere, therefore, 
by internal silently-operating powers, not by the arbitrary will of a 
law-giver." /d. at 30. He was arguing against the creation of a national law 
for Germany, and in favor of preserving local variation. 
24. See, e.g., Herman Heller, The Nature and Structure of the State, 18 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1139 (1996); Frank Michaelman, Law's Republic, 97 
YALE L.J. 1493 (1988). 
25. See, e.g., Gunther Teubner, Breaking Frames: The Global Interplay 
of Legal and Social Systems, 45 AM. J. CoMP. L. 149, 157-59 (1997). 
26. To an important degree, the existence of the ISO and its national 
affiliates dates back to a time when the primary purpose of 
nongovernmental standard setting was to help buyers and sellers achieve 
shared understandings of what standards the products they bought and 
sold would meet. 
The geographic scope of certification programs varies greatly. The FSC 
and the ISO are global. Other programs, such as the Pan European Forest 
Certification Council, are regional. See Pan European Forest 
Certification Website, supra note 15. The AF&PA is national program 
based in the United States. There are also a number of sub-national 
certification programs, though they are likely to be viable only in the 
narrowest markets. 
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site-specific discretion. 27 
( 4) Provisions for public participation 28 
(5) Mechanisms for sanctioning non-compliance,29 
usually: 
(a) withdrawal of certification, and/or 
(b) expulsion from membership in a group. 
In sum, environmental certification programs have 
most of the same basic organizational elements of legal sys­
tems. What they generally lack is a command from a sover­
eign directing all management organizations in a given cate­
gory to achieve certification standards, and subjecting them 
to sovereign-imposed penalties for failure to do so. As indi­
cated above, certification systems are generally character­
ized as "voluntary." Firms subscribe to them because they 
determine that it is in their interest to do so. Yet it is increas­
ingly common to describe environmental certification as a 
"de facto requirement" for doing business in many jurisdic­
tions.30 When interviewed, corporate officials often state 
that they feel they have "no real choice" but to become envi­
ronmentally certified. The reasons they give vary, and in­
clude such factors as avoiding intensified government regu­
lation, maintaining or expanding· market share, averting 
negative publicity, improving community and/or employee 
relations, improving organizational efficiency, meeting de­
mands of up-stream sellers or down-stream buyers, obtain­
ing higher prices, avoiding legal liability, increasing share­
holder confidence, and so on. Although many of these rea­
sons do not flow directly from government regulation, they 
do suggest a context in which industrial enterprises view en­
vironmental certification as a mandatory condition of oper­
ating in modern society. Moreover, some certified large 
firms have begun mandating certification for their suppliers. 
Ford, General Motors, and Daimler-Chrysler, fdr example, 
have all established timetables for having all of their sup­
pliers ISO 14001 certified.31 In addition, programs such as 
SFI require that members undertake to conduct training 
programs for all of the contractors who supply them; they 
also encourage "licensing" of non-members who wish to 
be certified.32 
Thus, the gap between coercive government regula­
tion and "voluntary" private certification is not as wide as 
27. See supra note 19. 
28. Public participation provisions vary considerably among programs 
and often seem designed to limit rather than expand the public role in 
standard setting and certification. See Private Environmental Regulation, 
supra note 2. 
29. There is no systematic information on how often certification 
systems actually employ .sanctions. My impression from communicating 
with knowledgeable sources is that sanctions are rarely imposed. 
30. See, e.g., Virginia Haufler, Private Sector International Regimes, 4 
PoLIBUS 2 ( 1998); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Private Voluntary 
Standard-Setting, the International Organization for Standardization, 
and International Environmental Lawmaking, in 6 YEARBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 107, 1 19 (Gunther Hand! ed., 
1995); Joel Ticknor, ISO 14000: Will It Deter Cleaner Production?, 8 
NEW SOLUTIONS 285, 286 (1998). 
3 1 .  See the news releases collected at ISO 1 4000-What 's New, at 
http://www.isol4000.com/WhatsNew (last visited Nov. 25, 2000). 
32. See Sustainable Forestry Initiative Program, supra note 9. 
33. As is noted in section V, the list is largely limited to "legal" 
might be expected. Moreover, many of the reasons given to 
explain the growth of certification have at different times in 
history been grounds for expanded government regulation. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that complex relationships 
might emerge between certification and legal systems. 
The next two sections catalog some of the legal chan­
nels through which those relationships can operate. Section 
III lists legal mechanisms that seem largely receptive to cer­
tification systems, while Section IV lists ones that seem 
more resistant. It is important to note, however, that most of 
the legal mechanisms described below could in principle be 
used either to promote or to undermine certification pro..: 
grams, or indeed to promote some and undermine others. 
III. Legal Incorporation of Certification Systems 
Environmental certification programs can be incorporated 
in law through a variety of means.33 
A. Legal Requirement of Certification 
The most obvious means of incorporating certification into 
law is for an authoritative legal body to require that firms op­
erating within its jurisdiction be certified. That legal body 
could be either a legislature or an administrative agency 
with a broad mandate to achieve environmental improve­
ment. There is much to commend this strategy, since it can 
mandate global, state-of-the-art standards, place much of 
the administrative burden on non-state bureaucracies 
funded by the enterprises involved, and garner some of the 
political legitimacy of environmental nongovernmental or­
ganizations for the government regulatory system. The 
downsides include a reduction in government control over 
regulatory policy (although the government retains the op­
tion of imposing and administering its own standards) and 
potentially higher costs of operation for enterprises than if 
government agencies bear the costs of administration. 34 To 
date there are few examples of governments requiring envi­
ronmental certification35: the Brazilian state of Acre re­
cently made FSC certification a requirement for practicing 
forestry in the state, 36 and Zimbabwe has incorporated ISO 
mechanisms as conceived in traditional legal scholarship. Other important 
micro and macro dimensions of incorporation should also be considered. 
34. Of course there are contending normative arguments regarding who 
should bear administrative costs. One position is that the public should 
bear them, since the certification program promotes the public interest in 
an improved environment The other is that the enterprise should bear 
them, ordinarily through increased costs to its consumers, since it creates 
the situation requiring the regulatory program. This is the so-called 
polluter-pays principle. The position one takes on these questions depends 
on the entitlement structure from which one begins the analysis. 
35. Requirements for narrower kinds of certification, such as standards 
for pollution control equipment, operator training, and maintenance 
programs, appear to be quite common in environmental regulation. 
Personal communication, John Shoaff, Pollution Prevention Division, 
U.S. EPA (July 20, 2000). 
36. Personal communications, Professor Michel Becker, Institute for 
Forest Policy, University of Freiburg and Dr. Dietrich Burger, German 
Organization for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), Frankfurt, Germany 
(Feb. 28, 2000). 
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14001 into its regulatory system.37 Yet, it seems likely that 
their numbers will grow as the certification systems mature 
and become better known. 
Provided they have broad enough authority, adminis­
trative agencies could also legally mandate certification. 
Where agencies are limited to traditional administrative 
mechanisms, legislatures could give them added authority 
to require certification. Agencies mandating certification 
would most likely use rules in conjunction with contracts. A 
rule, for example, could simply require specified types of 
firms operating in the jurisdiction to be certified by a spe­
cific program or by one of several eligible programs. Con­
tracts could then be used by the agency to achieve a degree 
of control over the certification programs without going 
through more cumbersome rulemaking or adjudication pro­
cedures. While these methods are being used in some other 
areas of privatization, such as prisons and healthcare/8 their 
extension to environmental regulation would probably be a 
new development. It should be noted, however, that U.S. en­
vironmental laws already give a large role to private enforc­
ers through "citizen suit'' provisions, which allow interested 
parties to bring enforcement actions for violations of federal 
or state pollution control standards.l9 
In the U.S.legal system, a law requiring certification 
by a nongovernmental entity would probably face legal 
challenges based on the "nondelegation doctrine," which is 
generally held to prohibit the delegation of law makirtg 
powers to private actors.4 0 There are several solutions, how­
ever, the simplest of which is for the legislature to review the 
standards involved and to enact them as its own if it so 
37. See Paulette L. Stenzel, Can the ISO 14000 Series Environmental 
Standards Provide a Viable Alternative to Government Regulation?, 37 
AM. Bus. L.J. 237,276 (2000). Whether these examples are evidence that 
developing countries are especially likely to adopt private environmental 
certification requirements in their regulatory systems can only be known 
over time. 
38. See generally Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 
75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543 (2000); Laurent Hourcle & Frederick J. Lees, 
Applicability of ISO 14000 Standards to Government Contracts, 27 ELR 
10071 (Jan. 1997). 
39. See generally Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing 
Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Analysis of Citizen Suits Under 
Federal Environmental Laws, 35 BuFF. L. REv. 834-965 (1985). 
Government agencies can exercise control over such actions either by 
taking over prosecution of the case or by intervening in the private 
enforcement action. If the government does take over prosecution of the 
case, the private litigant retains the right to continue participating as an 
intervenor. Id. 
40. The key decision wasCarter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), 
which invalidated a New Deal statute allowing bituminous coal producers 
to elect boards to set minimum prices for coal in their districts. The court 
stressed the possible conflicts of interests of business representatives 
regulating others in their industry. For a contemporary analysis of 
delegations outside government, see Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the 
Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative 
Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 62 (1990). 
41. Interestingly, one problem that could arise derives from the fact that 
many nongovernmental standards are copyrighted. The ISO, for example, 
vigorously enforces the copyrights on its thousands of standards and 
guidelines. Together with its member organizations, the ISO appears to 
depend on the sale of those publications for significant revenue. One can 
only speculate how the ISO and other standard-setting organizations 
chooses. 4 1  It might even suffice for the legislature to reserve 
the power to review the nongovernment rules and to provide 
for judicial review of them under general administrative 
law.4 2 In the case of administrative agencies, which have 
convened a number of negotiated rulemaking (reg-neg) 
committees of stakeholders to negotiate draft rules in recent 
years, it is suffi�ient that the agency convene a "balanced" 
committee, review the rule developed by the committee, 
and subject it to normal agency decisional procedures.4 3 
If state or federal governmental bodies in the United 
States were to mandate certification, questions regarding 
the applicability of antitrust law and. administrative law 
would also arise. The antitrust issues, while too in­
volved to discuss fully here, could probably be man­
aged. In the first instance, many problems could likely 
be avoided by providing for competition among alterna­
tive certifiers. In addition, U.S. antitrust law has a gen­
eral exception for anticompetitive conditions resulting 
from intentional state action.44 Thus, antitrust problems 
could be managed through clear, legislatively autho­
rized policies providing for certifier competition and su­
pervised by government agencies.4 5  
The administrative law issues raised by mandated 
certification would divide among statutory and constitu­
tional questions. The main constitutional question would be 
whether the Due Process Clause applies to certification pro­
cesses. The U.S. Supreme Court has tended to narrow the 
definition of"state action" to which the clause applies in re­
cent years. 46 But it is not entirely clear that the rulemaking 
and adjudication involved in standard setting and certifica-
might respond to government proposals to enact their standards into law. I 
am indebted to John Shoaff for reminding me of this issue. 
42. This is what the states often have done when privatizing prison 
administration. See, e.g., Ira P. Robbins, The Impact of the Delegation 
Doctrine on Prison Privatization, 35 UCLAL. REv. 911, 942-50(1988). 
43. As authorized by the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. 
§561. The statute requires the agency to exercise somewhat more control 
over the reg-neg process than described in the text, but this is not a 
constitutional requirement. 
44. Parker v. Brown, 317U.S. 341 (1943}(upholding aCalifomia statute 
fixing the price of raisins). 
45. California Retail Liquor Dealer's Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 
445 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1980) (defining the clear statement and state 
supervision criteria). Absent active and effective state involvement, 
however, firms participating in self-regulatory standard setting do face 
risks of antitrust liability. See, e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian 
Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988) (holding the National Fire Protection 
Association (NFP A}, a nongovernmental standard setting organization, 
liable for antitrust violations, when steel manufacturers ulied its processes 
to prevent approval of plastic conduit as an alternative to steel in the 
NFPA's National Electrical Code, which was subsequently adopted by 
many governmental bodies). See also FEDERAL TRADE CoMM'N & U.S. 
DOJ, GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG CoMPETirORS (Apr. 
2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf 
(last visited Oct 20, 2000). 
46. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 38, at 576-632; Alfred C. Aman Jr., 
Globalization and the U.S. Administrative Procedures Act: Furthering 
Democracy and the Global Public Interest, Bloomington Snyder Lecture, 
Lauterpacht Center for International Research, University of Cambridge 
(Feb. 3, 1999). Social &ience Research Network Electronic Library, at 
http://papers.ssm.com/paper.taflabstract_id=176691 (last visited July 
19, 2000) (copy on file with author). 
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tion processes would be exempt. Thus, it is at least conceiv­
able that certifiers would have to meet due process standards 
if certification were state mandated. That might not be par­
ticularly difficult, however, since due process requirements 
generally are not stringent,47 and since many nominally pri­
vate organizations have already incorporated comparable 
procedures.48 Nonetheless, some certification programs 
might be prompted to open up their process somewhat under 
the glare of increased public scrutiny. 
In the statutory realm, it is quite unlikely that statutes 
such as the federal Administrative Procedure Act49 and sim­
ilar state acts would be held to apply to certification pro­
cesses as currently written. Most administrative procedure 
statutes apply only to acts of government agencies. Nothing, 
however, would preclude legislatures from making them ap­
plicable to certification processes. Moreover, it seems likely 
that if governments were to mandate certification they could 
eventually be persuaded to subject certification systems to 
administrative law-like procedural requirements.50 
B. Official Promotion of Certification 
Rather than "sticks," governments can use "carrots" to pro­
mote preferred policies. Given their ability to avert legal and 
political challenges based on delegation of law making 
powers while still altering environmental practices, govern­
ment-provided incentives could turn out to be the preferred 
policy instrument for promoting certification. Several large 
U.S. administrative agencies either are considering or h.ave 
made ISO 14001 certification one of their purchasing crite-
47. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), defining a loose, 
three-part balancing test for constitutionally required administrative 
procedures. Given its open-endedness and amenability tO highly variable 
application, it is impossible to predict what procedural changes in 
certification this test might require. There are complex problems in 
standard setting organizations, however, some of which do not provide the 
equivalent of notice and comment rulemaking, or do limit participation to 
those with direct, material interests. See generally John P. Shoaff, 
"Business as Usual or an Instance of Reinvention and Privatization in 
Environmental Rulemaking? New Rules and Issues With the Use of 
Voluntary Consensus Standards," May 25, 1999, at 31 (unpublished 
paper; copy on file with author). 
48. See generally Lauren Edelman, Legal Environments and 
Organizational Governance: The Expansion of Due Process in the 
American Workplace, 95 AM. J. Soc. 1401 (1990). 
49. 5 U.S.C. §§500-596, available in ELR STAT. ADMIN. PRoc. 
50. See infra section IV. 
51. The U.S. Departments of Defense and Energy evidently require ISO 
14001 certification for first- and second-level suppliers (second-level 
suppliers are those who provide supplies to firms that actually supply 
products to the agencies). Stenzel, supra note 37, at 270. 
52. U.S. EPA, Audit Policy: Incentives for Self-Policing, 60 Fed. Reg. 
66706 (Dec. 22, 1995) ("Where violations are found through voluntary 
environmental audits or efforts that reflect a regulated entity's due 
diligence, and are promptly disclosed and expeditiously corrected, EPA 
will not seek gravity-based (i.e., noneconomic benefit) penalties and will 
generally not recommend criminal prosecution against the regulated 
entity."). In addition, the Federal Sentencing Commission has provided 
that criminal defendants with "environmental compliance programs," 
which many certification programs would probably qualify as, can have 
their sentences significantly reduced. See ToM TIBOR & IRA FELDMAN, 
ISO 14000: A GUIDE TO 1HE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 
STANDARDS 226 (1995); see also Organization Sentencing Guidelines, 56 
Fed. Reg. 22762, §8A1.2, Cmt. K (U.S. Sentencing Comm. 1991 ); Draft 
ria. 51 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has 
promulgated a number of policies that explicitly or implic­
itly promote certification. Its enforcement policies, for ex­
ample, while not directed solely at certification programs, 
indicate that environmental certification will be viewed as a 
positive factor in r�viewing organizational compliance re­
cords.52 EPA's Office of Compliance Assurance and Moni­
toring is integrating EMS elements into its enforcement pro­
tocols and settlement criteria.53 The Agency has also used 
ISO 14001 in several of its Project XL multimedia permit­
ting processes. 54 In addition, EPA has published several doc� 
uments and handbooks assisting and promoting develop­
ment of ISO 1400 1-style management systems for both in­
dustry and for local governments, 55 and has supported re­
search in support of the further deployment of EMSs. 56 
Most significantly, EPA recently instituted a new 
"Performance Track" program giving special treatment to 
firms meeting certification-like requirements. Tq qualify, 
companies must: (1) adopt and implement an EMS, (2) 
commit to improved environmental performance, (3) com­
mit to public outreach and performance reporting, and ( 4) 
have a record of sustained compliance with environmental 
requirements.57 In addition to displaying the Performanc� 
Track logo, qualified companies enjoy streamlined moni­
toring, recordkeeping, and reporting under the Clean Air 
Act (CAA)58 and the Clean Water Act, 59 and increased flexi­
bility in installing "best available control technology" under 
Corporate Guidelines for Environmental Violations, §§9C1.2, 9Dl . l  
(U.S. Sentencing Comm. 1993). Even the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation has published draft guidance indicating that an ISO 14001 
management system will help project sponsors demonstrate 
environmental monitoring and management capacity meeting its 
requirements for support. See United States International Development 
Cooperation Agency (ICDA), Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
(OPIC), Request for Comments on Draft Environmental Handbook; 
Notice, 63 Fed. Reg. 9696 (Feb. 25, 1998). 
53. U.S. EPA, DRAFT EMS AcTioN PLAN FOR PuBLIC CoMMENT 
(Dec. 20, 1999), available at EPA Reinvention http://www.epa.gov/ems/ 
plan99.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2000). 
54. One of the most recent is with Imation Enterprises Corporation, the 
world's largest manufacturer of magnetic data storage tapes. /d. at 15. 
55. See,e.g., U.S. EPA, Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics, 
Environmental Management Systems, at http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/ 
dfe/tools/ems/ems.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2000); U.S. EPA, Office of 
Wastewater Management, Environmental Management Systen).s: An 
Implementation Guide for Small and Medium-Sized Organizations, 
available at Environmental Management Systems/JSO 14001-Publications 
http://www.epa.gov/owmitnet/wm046200.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 
2000). 
56. See, e.g., Position Statement on Environmental Management 
Systems and ISO 14001 and a Request for Comments on the Nature of the 
Data to Be Collected From Environmental Management System/ISO 
14001 Pilots, 63 Fed. Reg. 12094-97 (Mar. 12, 1998), available at USEPA 
Federal Register Document http://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr/EP A-GENERAU 
1998/March/Day-12/g6389.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2000). 
57. U.S. EPA, National Environmental Peiformance Track, at 
http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack (last visited Oct. 25, 2000). 
58. 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7671q, ELR STAT. CAA §§101-618. 
59. 33 U.S.C. §§1251-1387, ELR STAT. FWPCA §§101-607. 
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the CAA. 60 How significant this program will be in changing 
business practices remains to be seen. Yet it is important to 
note that by requiring improved performance and public 
performance reporting, EPA appears to be using it to get 
companies to go beyond the bare ISO 14001 requirements. 
This could in turn lead to a reshaping of the ISO and other 
certification programs over time. 
There have been similar developments at the state 
level. Before EPA instituted the ·performance Track pro­
gram, Connecticut passed an "Act Concerning Exemplary 
Environmental Management Systems." 'Fhe Act provides 
special benefits to companies that have: (1) registered ISO 
14001 EMSs, (2) adopted approved principles of 
sustainability, and (3) good compliance records. The bene­
fits include: (1) expedited permit review, (2) reduced fees, 
(3) less frequent reporting, (4) facilitywide permits for ap­
proved firms, and (5) public recognition of having attained 
this achievement.61 While it is difficult to track develop­
ments like this, other states might well adopt similar legisla­
tion. Whether they do or not, it is important to remember that 
favorable treatment of certified firms is only part of the gov­
ernment enforcement package that will best promote certifi­
cation. The other part is effective enforcement of the envi­
ronmental laws, which minimizes the relative economic dis-
advantages of certification for firms. ' ' 
Government agencies can also promote the expan­
sion of certification programs by subjecting themselves to 
them. A number of state and local agencies responsible for 
managing public forests have had their forests certified. 
Some have chosen the more environmentally and socially 
demanding FSC program,62 others the somewhat less pro­
tective AF&PA program.63 The federal land management 
agencies appear to have no near-term intention of seeking 
third-party certification of their lands.64 EPA, by contrast, 
60. U.S. EPA, National Environmental Performance Track, supra note 
57. 
61.  See State of Connecticut, Substitute House Bill No. 6830, at 
http:/ /www.cga.state.ct.us/ps99/ Act/pa/1999P A-00226-ROOHB-06830-
PA.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2000). This provision, like much of the other 
information in this Article, came to my attention through the "voluntary 
codes" list-serve maintained by Kernaghan Webb. This is an invaluable 
source of information, and can be accessed at The Voluntary Codes 
Research Forum, at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/ca00973e.html (last 
visited Nov. 28, 2000). 
62. Thus far, the agencies responsible for managing state-owned lands in 
Minnesota, New York, and Pennsylvania have either achieved FSC 
certification or announced that they intend to do so. Margot Higgins, New 
York Forests Get Green Thumbs-Up, ENVTL. NEws NETWORK, Feb. 5, 
2000, available at http://www.enn.com/enn-news-archive/2000/02/ 
02052000/certification_9680.asp (last visited Nov. 28, 2000). 
63. For example, Itaska and Lake counties, Minnesota. See Sustainable 
Forestry Initiative Program Licensees, at http://www.afandpa.org/forestry/ 
sfilsfi_license.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2000). 
64. See Forest Stewardship Council United States, Federal LanQ-Policy 
Statement Concerning FSC-Endorsed (:ertification on U.S. Federal Lands, 
at http://www.fscus.org/standards__policies/current_issues/federallands. 
html (visited July 19, 2000). An ironic part of the problem here is that 
national environmental groups have opposed certification of federal lands 
because they fear that certification would undermine their goal of a "zero 
cut" policy on federal lands. 
65. See U.S. EPA, DRAFT EMS AcnoN PLAN FOR PuBLIC CoMMENT, 
supra note 53; U.S. EPA, Code of Environmental Management Principles 
has put a considerable effort into promoting the use of 
!SO-style EMSs at all levels of government, including its 
own operations and those of other agencies, 65 although gov­
ernment agencies often stop short of formal certification in 
order to minimize taxpayer expenses. 
C. Express Adoption of the Same or Substantially Similar 
Standards 
As noted above, independent enactment of certification 
standards would be one way of avoiding delegation doctrine 
problems.66 Because the states and the federal government 
share authority over environmental protection, adoption of 
certification standards could occur at either level. More­
over, it could be done either by legislatures, or by adminis­
trative agencies with broad substantive and procedural man­
dates. At the legislative level, no evidence of formal adop­
tion of environmental certification standards has come to 
light during the preparation of this Article.67 In the past, 
however, many other types of privately generated standards 
have been adopted by North American legislatures. 68 Given 
the inherent attractiveness of ready-made standards, envi­
ronmental certification standards seem likely to become in­
creasingly important in federal and state legislative pro­
cesses over time. As that happens, legislatures doubtlessly 
will be tempted to change certification standards to reflect 
their particular concerns, as they have done with model leg­
islation in other areas such as criminal and product liability 
law.69 On the other hand, pressure for interjurisdictional 
consistency in standards is growing, and privately gener­
ated international environmental standards could prove 
quite robust. 70 
At the administrative level, U.S. agencies have a long 
history of incorporating privately generated standards in 
for Federal Agencies, 61 Fed. Reg. 54061-54066 (Oct. 16, 1996), possibly 
superseded by Greening the Government Through Waste Prevention, 
Recycling, and Federal Acquisition, Exec. Order No. 13101,  63 Fed. Reg. 
49643 (Sept. 16, 1998), ELR ADMIN. MAT. 45100 (stressing recycling 
and pollution prevention practices rather than full blown EMSs). 
66. , Again there is a possible copyright problem in this scenario. See 
supra note 41. · 
67. However, Bolivia recently adopted forestry standards virtually 
identical to the FSC standards. Personal Communication, Dr. Dietrich 
Burger, Forestry Program, Deutsche Gesellschaft fiir Technische 
Zusammenarbeit (German Organization for Technical Cooperation), 
Eschbom (Feb. 28, 2000). · 
68. See generally Robert W. Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental 
Standards in the Development of Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting 
Safety or Health, 56 TEx. L. REv. 1329 (1978). State and local legislatures 
have also adopted uncounted private codes in such areas as plumbing, 
construction, accounting practices, and the like. Id. at 1366. 
69. Examples include the Model Penal Code, the Uniform Commercial 
Code, Restatements of Torts and Contracts, and the like. 
70. The question of how much demand there is for interjurisdictional 
consistency is in fact quite complex. While some industrial interests 
operating in multiple legal jurisdictions have powerful interests in 
uniform standards, others, either operating in a narrower set of 
jurisdictions or having more capacity to vary performance according to 
locale, have equally strong interests in differential standards, which they 
have a comparative advantages in meeting. 
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public regulations. Sometimes the private standards· are 
small elements of rules covering larger topics, as in a Fed­
eral Trade Commission rule incorporating the American So­
ciety for Testing and Materials' standard for measuring gas­
oline octane in a rule requiring sellers to post octane ratings 
on their pumps.71 Other times agency rules are aimed at es­
sentially the same issues as the private standards. When the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration began op­
erations in 1971, for example, it quickly converted a whole 
raft of voluntary health and safety standards into regulatory 
requirements.72 Other agencies have done the same.73 It is 
clear that EPA has often drawn upon nongovernmental stan­
dards in setting regulatory requirements, but there appear to 
be no published studies providing a comprehensive over­
view ofhow it has done this. In addition, the National Tech­
nology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (NTTAA) 
requires that federal agencies "use technical standards that 
are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus bodies" 
and participate in their development where possible. 74 The 
exact reach of the statute remains open to interpretation, par­
ticularly because it does not define key terms such as "tech­
nical standard" and "voluntary consensus body."75 Nonethe­
less, it seems likely to exert a steady pull on agency practice 
over time. 
It is also important to note that some environmental 
certification standards might be difficult for agencies to in­
corporate, because they include areas beyond the jurisdic­
tion of any single agency. The FSC standards, for example, 
include indigenous rights, worker safety, and community 
economic concerns, in addition to environmental protec­
tion-concerns well beyond the jurisdiction of any single 
agency. Although some federal and state administrative 
agencies have been trying to achieve cross-agency policy 
71 .  See, e.g., National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. Federal Trade 
Comm'n, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 95 1 
(1974). 
72. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration's review of 
private standards was not always stellar, and it sometimes mandated 
standards that were either poorly developed or obsolete, such as a rule 
against ice in drinking water that derived from the days when all ice was 
obtained from frozen lakes and rivers. On the other hand, it also achieved 
considerable successes by using private standards. See Hamilton, supra 
note 68, at 13 88-99. Though over 20 years old, .this study remains one of 
the few serious pieces of research ever to have been done on regulatory 
incorporation of privately set standards in the United States. 
73. See id. at 1399-436. 
74. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, 1 5  
U.S.C. §3701 (1996). The statute requires agencies to utilize voluntary 
standards unless doing so would be "inconsistent with law or otherwise 
impractical," and to report decisions not to use such standards to the Office 
of Management and Budget. 
75. For a careful analysis of the statute and its possible effects on 
environmental regulation by EPA, see Shoaff, supra note 47. It is also 
important to note that the Office of Management and Budget has 
promulgated a revised version of Circular A-1 19, which seeks to provide 
guidance to executive branch agencies on how to implement the Act. 
Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-1 19, Federal Participation 
in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and in 
Conformity Assessment Activities, 63 Fed. Reg. 8545 (Feb. 19, 1998). 
Shoaff's analysis explores a number of important ambiguities in the reach 
of the statute, particularly regarding what kinds of standards and 
standard-setting bodies are promoted by the statute. 
coordination in recent years, the going has been very diffi­
cult. 76 This could conceivably mean either that 
nongovernmental programs have a significant long-term 
structural advantage over governmental programs, or 
that their efforts to integrate multiple concerns are too 
far ahead of governmental programs to be attractive to 
most industries. 
Overall, the quality of legislative and administrative 
deliberation in adopting private standards has varied tre­
mendously in different situations. Sometimes goyernment 
bodies have carefully reviewed, evaluated, and appropri­
ately amended private standards; other times they have 
not.77 When administrative agencies incorporate standards, 
they are subject to judicial review and must produce deci­
sional records sufficient to persuade reviewing courts that 
their decisions were rational and based on adequate evi­
dence.78 The NTTAA may make it somewhat easier for 
agency rules incorporating private standards to sustain judi­
cial review, since it expresses a general preference for such 
standards, and puts a special burden on agencies to explain 
decisions in which they choose not to use them. 
D. Indirect Adoption Through "Environmental" Laws 
Some of the most important and difficult-to-trace forms of 
legal change unfold in informal processes. These processes 
include broad discussions it;1 industrial, professional, and 
policy circles,79 as well as specific transactions among 
firms, regulators, 80 and sometimes community organiza­
tions. 81 It seems quite likely that environmental certification 
programs will affect regulatory programs through these al­
most invisible channels, beyond whatever changes are pro­
mulgated as official policy. Some tacit changes are likely to 
occur as inspectors evaluate practices at industrial facilities 
76. See, e.g., Errol Meidinger, Organizational and Legal Challenges for 
Ecosystem Management, in CREATING A FORESTRY FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY: THE SCIENCE OF ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 361 (Kathryn A. 
Kohm & Jerry F. Franklin eds., 1997). 
� 
77. See Hamilton, supra note 68, at 1 386-87. It appears to be extremely 
common for state legislatures to include private standards in legislation by 
reference, sometimes providing that changes in the standards will 
automatically be mandated by the legislation. Jd. 
78. Several Consumer Product Safety Commission rules based on 
preexistent standards, for example, failed the 'substantial evidence' test 
on judicial review. I d. at 1401 .  Absent statutory directives to the contrary, 
agency rules are subject to the nominally Jess stringent "arbitrary and 
capricious" standard under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 
§706(2)(a), though there is disagreement among scholars about whether 
there is really any difference between the two review standards. 
79. An example is the growth of the field of "industrial ecology." See, 
e.g., ROBERT U. AYERS & LESLIE W. AYERS, INDUSTRIAL ECOLOGY: 
TOWARDS CLOSING THE MATERIAL CYCLE (1996); THOMAS E. 
GRAEDEL & BRADEN R. ALLENBY, INDUSTRIAL ECOLOGY (1995). 
80. See' for example the negotiations described by KEITH HAWKINS, 
ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT: REGULATION AND THE SociAL 
DEFINITION OF POLLUTION (1984). 
8 1 .  For a description of community participation, see R. Nils Olsen Jr., 
The Concentration of Commercial Hazardous Waste Facilities in the 
Western New York Community, 39 BUFF. L. REv. 473 (1991). 
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and question whether firms are following best practices. 
Others may come into play when permits go through revi­
sion cycles and regulators or public interest groups push for 
up-to-date standards. Regulatory officials can also promote 
certification standards in their choices of firms to inspect 
and monitor. Thus, they might decide to treat certification as 
an indicator of strong performance and to concentrate their 
enforcement efforts on other firms. 8 2  As it becomes apparent 
in an industry that certified firms are likely to suffer fewer or 
less intensive inspections or to find it easier to get necessary 
regulatory approvals, the standard of practice in the industry 
would likely converge with that of the certification program. 
In the Canadian "strict liability" regulatory regime 
certification standards may play an additional indirect role 
in shaping regulatory standards. The government can con­
vict � firm of a violation simply by showing that the firm vi­
olated a standard, without offering any evidence on the 
overall quality of the firm's management. The firm can 
counter, however, with a "due diligence" defense, which in­
volves showing that it exercised reasonable care under the 
circumstances. 83 At least one Ontario court has treated fail­
ure to receive industry certification as failure of the due dili­
gence defense. 84 Certification standards have also been in­
corporated into law through remedies. In another Canadian 
case involving a violation of air pollution standards, the de­
fendant proposed, and the judge accepted, a remedy requir­
ing the defendant to achieve I SO 1 400 1 certification. Of 
course, such certification was not a requirement of the regu­
lations involved, but was incorporated through the equitable 
powers of the judge to impose an appropriate remedy. 85 
Finally, it should also be noted that international en­
vironmental law may become an important source of indi­
rect incorporation of certification standards. Discussions 
about how to implement the Kyoto Protocol for the Reduc­
tion of Greenhouse Gasses, for example, include the possi­
bility of using F SC forest certification to verify the mainte­
nance of carbon retention "sinks,"86 as well as using I SO 
14001 management systems to achieve reductions in green­
.house gas emissions.87 What role such mechanisms will in 
fact play remains open at present, but their proponents are 
82. The appropriateness of preferential treatment for certified firms 
should not be presumed, however. At present there appears to be little 
empirical evidence that firms in certification programs generally perform 
better than uncertified firms. In the American Responsible Care® 
program, in fact, it appears that participants have reduced their pollution 
discharges no more quickly, and possibly more slowly, than 
nonparticipants. See Andrew King & Michael Lenox, Industry 
Self-Regulation Without Sanctions: The Chemical Industry's Responsible 
Care Program, AcAD. MGMT. J. (forthcoming 2000) (copy on file with 
author). The authors hypothesize that this may reflect several factors, 
including the possible attractions of participation as a "smoke screen" for 
poorly performing firms and the failure of the program to apply significant 
sanctions to date. They note that the program is considering taking 
stronger action against poor performers and the possibility of 
implementing a third-party verification program to replace the current 
self-verification program. They also indicate that increased external 
scrutiny, whether by government, non-governmental organizations, or 
community members, could stimulate significant improvements in the 
effectiveness of the program. 
83. Kernaghan Webb, Voluntary Initiatives and the Law, in VoLUNTARY 
actively promoting them as important tools for controlling 
global climate change. 
In all of the above ways, certification programs can 
be incorporated implicitly into government regulatory sys­
tems without going through formal legislative or 
rulemaking processes. They effectively change the defini­
tion of proper behavior, and increase the rewards for com­
pliance and the penalties for noncompliance with certifica­
tion standards. Given the paucity of empirical research in 
the area, it is unclear to what extent certification standards in 
fact have been incorporated in legal systems through infor­
mal processes. Yet it is clear that we need to look carefully at 
certification programs in order to understand. emerging re­
quirements in environmental law. 
E. Indirect Adoption Through "Nonenvironmental" Laws 
Environme:ntal certification standards can also be incorpo­
r a t e d  i n t o  l e g a l  systems through n o m i n a l ly 
nonenvironmental laws. This section lists some key areas 
where this is likely to happen. 
1. Tort Law 
Tort law sets standards for liability between parties who 
have not dealt with potential liability issues by contractual 
or other means. It usually applies to "accidents," often but 
not always between strangers. In general, U. S. tort law re­
quires parties who fail to follow standards of "reasonable 
care" to compensate those who are foreseeably injured as a 
result. Certification standards can be expected to infuse sev­
eral different areas of tort law. 
a. Toxic Torts 
The most obvious arena for potential incorporation is that of 
toxic torts, which involves liability for damage resulting 
from exposure to toxic environmental agents. The agents 
are usually chemicals, but can be biological organisms as 
well. 88 Certification standards are most likely to apply to the 
question of what constitutes reasonable care. Both substan­
tive and management system standards have the potential 
INITIATIVEs: THE NEw PoLmcs OF CoRPORATE GREENING 32, 33 (R. 
Gibson ed., 1 999). 
84. See Regina v. Domtar, O.J. No. 3415 (Ont.C.J., Gen. Div.) (1993), as 
cited in Webb, supra note 83, at 45 n.S. 
85. See Regina. v. Prospec Chems. Ltd., A.J. No. 174 (Alta. Prov. Ct.) 
(Jan. 25, 1996), as cited in Webb, supra note 83, at 46 n.7. The judge 
required the defendant to post a bondof$40,000 subject to forfeiture if the 
company failed to comply with the certification order. 
86. Forest Stewardship Council, Background Paper for FSC and Carbon 
Certification Workshop, available at FSC Website, supra note 2. 
87. ISO Technical Committee 207 Climate Change Task Force, 
Application of the ISO 14000 Series of Standards to the Issue of Global 
Climate Change, Draft Third Interim Report, June 2000 (Document 
Reference: ISO TC 207 CCTF N29R3). 
88. See, e.g., Gene J. Heady, Stuck Inside These Four Walls: Recognition 
of Sick Building Syndrome Has Laid the Foundation to Raise Toxic Tort 
Litigation to New Heights, 26 TEx. TEcH. L. REv. 1041, 1053 (1995). 
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for raising requirements. Consider the example of a firm 
that releases a toxic agent into a community and claims 
nonliability on grounds that its practices conformed to gov­
ernment regulations89 and industry standards. Plaintiffs 
could argue that the firm's lack of an ISO 1 4001 manage­
ment system constituted a failure to exercise reasonable care 
under the circumstances. Such an argument would be diffi­
cult for a defendant to counter, especially in light of the fact 
that a harmful release occurred. 
Often the most difficult elements to prove in toxic 
tort suits are injury and causation. Environmental certifica­
tion systems have the potential to aid plaintiffs in"these ar­
eas too, since they may require firms to gather and main­
tain data on a broad array of environmental effects. These 
data would probably be subject to discovery by plaintiffs in 
a lawsuit in many jurisdictions and could help show chains 
of causation and injury. Although some states have enacted 
statutes to protect companies from compulsory disclosure 
of information generated in preparing voluntary environ­
mental audits, such as would be done for iSO 1 4001 certifi­
cation, many states and the federal government have not 
enacted such statutes. 90 
b. Negligence 
Certification standards might also change liability standards 
for run-of-the-mill, nontoxic accidents. Consider the exam­
ple of an auto accident triggered by road damage resulting 
from slumping earth where a firm harvested timber on steep 
slopes. Although government regulations might permit it, 
and other firms might engage in similar harvesting, prohibi­
tion by a program such as that of the FSC could be taken as 
persuasive evidence offailure to exercise due care.91 Again 
note that the firm could be liable whether it was certified or 
not. Thus, law would operate to extend "voluntary" stan­
dards to nonparticipants. 
c. Nuisance 
General standards for land use in Anglo-Ameiican law are 
defined through the law of nuisance, which generally pro­
hibits uses of land that "substantially" and "unreasonably" 
interferes with the use and enjoyment of land by others.92 
89. This is sometimes called the "regulatory compliance" defense. On 
the whole, U.S. courts have tended not to defer to regulatory standards in 
tort cases. They have been criticized for this tendency in recent years, and 
doctrine in the area may be undergoing some change. See generally Robert 
L Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEo. L.J. 2049-84 
(2000). 
90. See Donald A. Carr & William L. Thomas, Devising a Compliance 
Strategy Under the ISO 14000 International Environmental Management 
Standards, 15 PACE ENVTL L. REV. 85, 191-205 (1997). 
91.  Although the issue is not central to this Article, note that the converse 
is also possible. Someone injured by a product or enterprise that met a 
privately set standard could sue the standard-setting organization in tort. 
Although U.S. courts traditionally eschew such suits, some important ones 
have been successful. See Shoaff, supra note 47, at 38 for an overview. See 
also Jeffrey Q. Smith et a!., Products Liability Claims Against Voluntary 
Standards Developers-An Update on Recent Developments, at American 
National Standards Institute Website http://web.ansi.org/public/library/ 
guides/prod_liability.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2000). 
Just what is unreasonable is hard to define, and depends on 
many factors (common practices in the area, priority in time, 
costs and benefits ofthe use, etc.). It is possible to anticipate, 
however, that in some instances certification standards, par­
ticularly substantive ones, could be called upon to define 
land uses as unreasonable. To offer a forestry example 
again, stream pollution that results from a clear cut larger 
than would be allowed by a certification system and that 
substantially affects the water quality of a downstream 
owner could potentially be cited as unreasonable, ari"d en­
joined by a court. The same might be true of air pollution 
suffered by downwind residents from a non-certified chemi­
cal plant. Thus again, certification standards would be 
drawn into the domain oflaw through general tort standards. 
d. Misrepresentation 
Tort law in the United States has long provided a cause of ac­
tion to anyone physically injured as a result of reasonable re­
liance on a fraudulent misrepresentation made by one who is 
in the business of selling a product.93 The common-law re­
quirement of physical harm is likely to limit the number of 
plaintiffs who can bring general common-law actions in­
volving certification prograrns,94 but it is conceivable that 
some physical harm might result from misrepresentation of 
fact such as certification status and give rise to suits outside 
of the negligence framework. 95 
In any case, related statutory provisions regarding 
misrepresentation clearly provide actions for economic 
harm. The most important is a broadly worded provision of 
the federal "Lanham Act," creating general liability for 
commercial misrepresentation of goods or services to either 
92. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, LAW OF TORTS (5th ed. 1984). 
93. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILI1Y §42B 
( 1998) ("one engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing 
products who, in connection with the sale of a product, makes a fraudulent, 
negligent, or innocent misrepresentation of a material fact concerning the 
product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by 
the misrepresentation"). 
94. See id. §21 .  
95. There have certainly been suits for misrepresentation ofhuman rights 
records. One brought against clothing manufacturers operating in Saipan, 
for example, contributed to a fairly far-reaching settlement monitored by a 
U.S. not-for-profit organization. Monitoring Program: A Plan for 
Implementing Settlement on Apparel Production in Saipan, at 
http://www.globalexchange.org/economy/corporations/saipan/monitori 
ng.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2000). 
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competitors or others who are damaged. 96 It seems clear that 
this provision could be used in suits against firms said to be 
misrepresenting their certification status. It is even possible 
that it might be used against firms who claim to be managing 
their forests sustainably, but are not certified. Such suits 
could conceivably be brought by competitors who are certi­
fied, and who claim that their competitors are falsely imply­
ing that they are as well. 97 Suits under this provision will cer­
tainly be worth watching! In addition, the Federal Trade 
Commission and various state attorneys general have the 
authority to brings suits against companies for commercial 
misrepresentation, and have often done so. 98 
2. Property Law 
Property law in the United States allows land owners to 
make environmental management commitments that will 
continue to be binding even if the land comes under new 
ownership. One of the most important forms is the "conser­
vation easement," through which an owner, while retaining 
possession of the land and the right to use it in many ways, 
can make specific commitments to another party regarding 
how the land will be used in the future. 99 The second party, 
which ordinarily must be a governmental or a not-for-profit 
organization, holds the "benefit" of the conservation ease­
ment. It has the power to determine whether the commit­
ments are being met, and to take action to enforce them if 
they are not. Certification appears to be an excellent way of 
enforcing the kinds of conservation easements that allow 
continued management for activities such as forestry or low 
impact agriculture, but prohibit overharvesting, reductions 
of biodiversity, and the like. Using certification as an en­
forcement mechanism would considerably reduce the bur­
den on benefit holders, and provide a "neutral," third-party 
96. Originally passed in 1946, the Lanham Act's false advertising 
provision was amended in 1988 to read as follows: 
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or ser­
vices, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any 
word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading 
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of 
fact, which is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, 
or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association 
of such person with another person, or as to the origin, spon­
sorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commer­
cial activities by another person, or in commercial advertis­
ing or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, 
qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another per­
son's goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable 
in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or 
is likely to be damaged by such act. 
15 U.S.C. § 1 125(a)(l). 
97. For examples of the many kinds of suits that have been brought by 
competitors under the Lanham Act, see Jean Wegman Bums, Confused 
Jurisprodence: False Advertising Under the Lanham Act, 29 B.U:- L. 
REv. 807 ( 1999). 
98. See Lee Goldman, The World's Best Article on Competitor Suits for 
False 4dvertising, 45 FLA. L. REv. 487, 505-06 (1993). 
99. The Uniform Conservation Easement Act defines a conservation 
easement as: 
(a] nonpossessory interest of a holder in real property impos­
ing limitations or affirmative obligations the purposes of 
assessment ofhow well the burdens of the easement are be­
ing met. Accordingly, it seems likely that drafters of conser­
vation easements will discover the benefits of certification 
and begin incorporating them in the agreements. 
A second area of property law where environmental 
certification could prove important is that ofNative Ameri­
can rights. Principle 3 of the FSC program provides that "the 
legal and customary rights of indigenous peoples to own, 
use and manage their lands, territories, and resources shall 
be recognized and respected."100 Certifiers therefore are 
likely to be placed in the position of determining Native 
American claims not only to land, but also to hunting and 
fishing rights, in the course of certifying forest management 
units. It seems quite likely that they will have to make find­
ings regarding Native American rights issues that have not 
been adjudicated by courts. It also seems likely that such 
findings will have significant effects on eventual legal defi­
nitions of native rights.101 
3. Tax Law 
Tax law could also become an important means of incorpo­
rating certification in the legal system. Conservation ease­
ments, for example, are often donated or sold to conserva­
tion organizations for very low prices. If the price received 
is less than the reduction in property value resulting from the 
transfer of the easement/02 that difference can qualify as a 
charitable deduction under federal income tax law103 and 
may bring additional tax benefits under state laws. Given 
the creativity of tax lawyers in arguing for deductions 
generally, it seems likely that other avenues in tax law 
will be probed in order to improve the financial benefits 
of certification. 
which include retaining or protecting natural, scenic, or 
open-space values of real property, assuring its availability 
for agricultural, forest, recreational, or open-space use, pro­
tecting natural resources, maintaining or enhancing air or wa­
ter quality, or preserving the historical, architectural, archae­
ological, or cultural aspects of real property. 
Unif. Conserv. Easement Act, § 1(1) (1981). The easement docu­
ment ordinarily defines in much greater detail which uses will be al­
lowed and which will not. See, e. g., JANET KIEHL & THoMAS 
BARRETT, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK (1988). The 
easement is recorded in the file on the property that is maintained by 
the central registry in the local jurisdiction where the property is lo­
cated. 
100. FSC Website, supra note 2. Reprinted in Appendix. 
101.  For an overview of the issues in Canada, see Mark L. Stevenson & 
Albert C. Peeling, Legal Memorandum Regarding Principle 3 of the 
Forest Stewardship Council's (FSC) Principles and Criteria, Prepared for 
the British Columbia Working Group, Forest Stewardship Council, May 
10, 2000 (copy on file with author). Although it does not discuss specific 
certification decisions, the memorandum concludes that national and 
regional standard-setting efforts have not dealt effectively with Native 
American rights questions thus far. 
102. Conservation easements are generally expected to reduce the market 
value of property because they transfer some of its development potential 
away from the property. 
103. 26 u.s.c. §170(h) (1994). 
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4. Information Regulation 
I 
As the Lanham Act indicates, U.S. law tends to treat infor­
mation relatively seriously.104 One very important statute in 
the environmental arena is the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right-To-Know Act (EPCRAY05 law, which 
requires users of specified toxic and hazardous chemicals to 
file annual reports disclosing names and quantities of chem­
icals either stored on site or released into the air, land, or wa­
ter.106 Other laws require additional reporting of information 
on water107 and air pollution.108 Jnformation reported under 
these statutes is generally avaihible to the public from state 
and federal environmental agencies. Although it can bp 
poorly coordinated and difficult to analyze, the value_ and 
accessibility of this information are likely to improve 
steadily as agencies implement modern, internet-oriented 
information systems as EPA has for the toxic release inven­
tory under EPCRA. 109 Moreover, if certification programs 
deliver on their promise to improve information produc­
tion, management, and analysis in firms, those improve­
ments may be reflected over time in new rules expanding 
public disclosure requirements. Finally, public reporting 
laws are likely to be important aids to public and private 
monitoring of the implementation of environmental certif­
ication programs in firms. By creating external capacity to 
compare certified firms to each other and to oocertified 
firms, it may also provide extra leverage for those pushing 
firms to become certified and certification programs to be­
come stringent.110 
5 .  Financial Regulation 
U.S. financial regulation may be even more reliant on infor­
mation disclosure than environmental regulation. Because 
the economic prospects of firms can be heavily affected by 
their environmental performance, financial regulation also 
has considerable potential to reinforce certification stan­
dards. Corporate disclosures are regulated both by detailed 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations, 
and by the general "anti-fraud" provisions of the securities 
laws, as well as by state laws. At present, the formal require­
ments of SEC rules are not particularly demanding regard­
ing environmental issues. They tend to focus on potential le­
gal liabilities of firms, and accord firms considerable discre-
104. One possibly important exception is continuing reliance on industry 
self-regulation in the area of electronic commerce. This area remains very 
dynamic, and. it is not clear either whether industry self-regulation will 
persist or whether it will have a significant influence on other areas. 
105. 42 U.S.C. §§1 1001-1 1050, ELR STAT. EPCRA §§301 -330. 
106. /d. §§1 1022, 1 1023, ELR STAT. EPCRA §§3 12, 3 13. 
107. See, e.g., the Clean Waler Act, 33 U.S.C. § 13 1 8, ELR STAT. FWPCA 
§308. 
108. See, e.g. ,42 U.S.C. §§7619, 765 lk, ELR STAT. CAA §§3 19, 412. 
109. See, e.g., the U.S. EPA, Toxic Release Inventory, at 
http://www.epa.gov/tri (last visiled Oct. 25, 2000). 
1 10. The King and Lenox research on the American Responsible Care® 
program suggests the polential power of public information reporting in 
assessing the effectiveness of certification programs. See supra note 82. 
tion in deciding whatto report. 111  However, certified firms 
are free to report their status, and many will do so. Such in­
formation is valuable both to general analysts assessing the 
likely profitability of firms and to green consumers seeking 
to distinguish between investment options based on envi­
ronmental performance. SEC regulations mandate "gener­
ally accepted accounting principles," which are largely es­
tablished by the profession" itself through its own stan­
dards-setting process.112 While the long-term existence and 
relative su,ccess of this division of responsibility suggests 
the potential of environmental certification programs, the 
immediately relevant point is that it provides a potential 
mechanism for incorporating certification status into finan­
cial reporting. Whether and how this will happen remains to 
be seen. An important trend, however, is that financial re­
porting standards relating to environmental performance 
are currently subject to increased attention and debate in the 
United States.113 The critique that reporting standards are 
overly conservative regarding environmental performance 
appears to be gaining ground. To the extent that it prevails, 
both formally and informally, financial reporting may be­
come an increasingly important channel for legal incorpora­
tion of environmental certification in the future. 
6 .  Trade Law 
The United States is a signatory to a number of international 
trade treaties, including the series of agreements referred to 
as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
GATT requires, among other things, that "where technical 
regulations are required and relevant international standards 
exist or their completion is imminent, Members shall use 
them . . .  as a basis for technical regulations."114 While this 
provision pushes governments to formally incorporate in­
ternational standards in their positive laws, GATT is also 
likely to have broader informal incorporation effects over 
time. By presumptively privileging international standards, 
GATT may give international environmental certification 
programs implicit legal standing regardless of whether their 
standards are formally incorporated in the laws of member 
states. This is especially so because the World Trade Organi­
zation (WTO), GATT's primary trade regulation body, has 
1 1 1 . See generally John W. Bagby et a!., So How Green Was My Balance 
Sheet?: Corporate Liability and Environmental Disclosure, 14 VA. 
ENVTL L.J. 225 (1995). 
1 12. The standard-setting process is organized through the Financial 
Standards Accounting Board, which also has an Emerging Issues Task 
Force that deals with problems such as those in the changeable field of 
environmental accounting and reporting. See id. at 306-07. 
1 13. !d. See also Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange 
Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 1 12 HARV. L. REV. 
1 197 (1999). 
1 14. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 1 5, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex lA, in 
REsuLTS OF TIIE URUGUAY RoUND OF MuLTILATERAL TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 20, 138 (GATT Secretariat, 1994). 
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found it extremely difficult to promulgate rules to date.115 
This situation virtually invites international nongovern­
mental standard-setting bodies to fill the vacuum as quickly 
as possible. 
R Forbearance 
What does it mean when government legal systems take no 
direct action regarding certification systems? Inaction is to be 
expected when certification systems are new and government 
has little experience with them. After certification programs 
become better understood, however, government forbear­
ance may begin to take on meaning. Most likely it will be 
taken to indicate tacit approval. It could even be seen as an 
implicit delegation of regulatory authority to the program. In 
pmctice, of course, it might simply be the case that legisla­
tures and agencies see more pressing needs for scarce govern­
ment resources in other areas. Intentionally or not, however, 
government forbearance could grow into a form of tacit dele­
gation over time, making it increasingly unlikely that govern­
ment will significantly expand its regulatory presence in the 
areas. Assuming there remains a societal expectation that 
some program is necessary, government forbearance may 
thus contribute to the long-term strengthening of environ­
mental certification programs. Institutionally oriented ob­
servers would see them as having been incorpomted into the 
social control system of which the formal legal system forms 
a part. That would have been accomplished with the assis­
tance of the legal system by its essentially doing nothing! 
:rv. Legal Control of Certification Systems 
Legal systems can shape certification systems, and not 
merely incorpomte them. Indeed, like the EPA Performance 
Track Program, many of the legal incorpomtion mecha­
nisms described above have the potential to affect the con­
tent and pmctice of certification as well. In geneml, certifi­
cation systems are likely to be shaped in part with an eye to 
how legal systems may react 
A. Informal Steering 
While government forbearance may be seen as a tacit form 
of approval or delegation, it can also be a tactical stmtegy for 
"steering" the development of certification progmms. Reg­
ulatory officials and certification officials are likely to ob­
serve each other's behavior. Government agencies are likely 
1 15. See, e.g., Marco Bronkers, Better Rules for a New Millennium: A 
Warning Against Undemocratic Developments in the WTO, 2 J. lNT'L 
Bus. L 547 (1999). 
1 16. See Shoaff, supra note 47, at 15,  35. See also U.S. GAO, 
CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: NEW GUIDANCE SHOULD ENCOURAGE 
TRANSPARENCY IN AGENCY DECISION MAKING, REPORT TO THE 
CHAIRMAN, CoMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS, HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES GAO/GCD-99-179 (Sept. 1999). 
1 11: The federal government, for example, has passed a statutory 
framework authorizing the U.S. Department of Agriculture to regulate the 
certification of organic foods. Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, 7 
U.S.C. §6501 (2000). The department has yet to promulgate final 
standards under the Act, so many states have enacted their own programs. 
J. Howard Beales III, Modification and Consumer Information: Modern 
Biotechnology and the Regulation of Information, 55 Fooo & DRUG L.J. 
105, 1 17 (2000). See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CoDE ANN. Sh-19.004 (2000); 
IowA ADMIN. CoDE 21-47.1(190C) (2000). 
to be able to affect the substance and implementation of cer­
tification progmms to some extent simply by how they sig­
nal they "might'' react to them. Of course, this is simply the 
mirror image of certification progmms trying to steer gov­
ernment policy, but it is important to note the capacity of 
government to affect progmms by doing nothing yet giving 
signals about what it might do. 
Governnients might also be able to steer certification 
programs by providing them with technical expertise, by ac­
tively participating in them, or by supporting research on 
their performance, all of which the United States is doing.116 
In particular, they could gather and support the analysis of 
data regarding the relative performance of certification pro­
grams and firms within them. Governments can thereby si­
multaneously hedge their policy bets and enhance the tmns­
parency of certification progmms. By thus facilitating in­
creased production and dissemination of information, they 
may also increase the learning capacity of the regulatory 
system as a whole. 
B. Direct Regulation 
Should informal steerirtg not suffice, governments always 
have the option of regulating certification programs. 1 17 They 
might do this in a number of ways. First, they could redefine 
the substantive .management standards that must be met by 
firms seeking to be certified. 1 18 Of course, such an action 
would pose a dilemma for certification programs, particu­
larly global ones, and they would have to decide whether to 
remain in business in the jurisdiction, try to get the law 
changed, ignore it, etc. Second, governments could impose 
rules governing the procedures followed by certification 
programs-standard-setting processes, certification pro­
cesses, enforcement processes, etc. They might, for exam­
ple, require more or different kinds of public participation in 
certification proceedings.119 They might require the disclo­
sure of information that designers of certification processes 
planned not to disclose.120 Given the discretion vested in 
certifiers · by many certification schemes, governments 
might also decide to defme minimum qualifications for 
c�rtifiers. In fact, governments could go so far as to develop 
public certification standards for private certification pro­
gmms! Note that the Connecticut law discussed above car­
ries the seeds of such possibilities within it. 
1 1 8. It should also be noted that the standards for certified firms could 
continue to be different from those for noncertified firms. 
1 1 9. Indeed, the U.S. antitrust laws already do so to some degree, by 
favoring standard-setting processes that are open, balanced, and transparent 
See generally David A. Swankin, How Due Process in the Development of 
- Voluntary Consensus Standards Can Reduce the Risk of Anti-Trust 
Liability, Prepared for the U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Nat'! Inst. of 
Standards and Tech., NIST -GCR-90-571 (1990); Shoaff, supra note 47, 
at 37. 
120. Research done for the Administrative Conference of the United 
States in the early 1 990s resulted in a recommendation that information of 
the kind discussed here generally should be made available to the public 
on the same terms as if the Freedom of Information Act applied. See 
Douglas C. Michael, Federal Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a 
Regulatory Technique, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 171 app. (1995). 
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There are many more possibilities. Two points 
should be kept in mind. First, certification programs per­
form public functions, functions that are most often carried 
out by government agencies under the types of rules listed 
above. Second, such forms of regulation have been imposed 
on other nongovernmental actors with public responsibili­
ties, such as medical professionals, 121 accountants, 122 law­
yers, and so on. There is no reason to assume that environ­
mental professionals will enjoy permanent immunity. 
C. Inhibition of Certification Systems 
1 .  National Trade Regulation 
Where industrial firms cooperate to set standards governing 
themselves, potentially raising prices for their products or 
inhibiting entry into their industry, national fair trade laws, 
such as the U.S. antitrust laws, are always likely to be an is­
sue. They have received considerable attention in develop­
ment of certification programs to date. Often this attention 
has been private, with certification organizations seeking 
confidential advice from law firms and conducting confi­
dential consultations with national · trade authorities.123 
Other times it has been public, sometimes when certifica­
tion programs explain why they cannot be more ambi­
tious, 124 and sometimes when they instruct participants on 
how to avoid antitrust problems.125 As noted in Section III, 
national trade laws can impose some constraints, but do 
not seem to be a major obstacle to certification programs at 
this time. 126 
2. International Trade Regulation 
The past few years have seen a major expansion in the power 
of international trading institutions, which have used a se­
ries of international treaties to impose increasingly signifi­
cant constraints on domestic regulatory programs. The 
WTO is currently responsible for implementing global trad­
ing policy by interpreting and applying GATT and recent 
important amendments on technical barriers to trade 
(TBTs ).127 As noted in Section III, the GATT system is likely 
to be an importation mechanism for legal incorporation of 
certification systems. It can also pose some problems, how­
ever. The main issue facing environmental certification sys­
tems is whether they might be classified by the WTO as 
121.  The U.S. health care system, for example, involves a very 
complicated mix of nongovernmental regulation by the Joint Commission 
on the Accreditation of Hospitals and detailed regulation of the behavior 
health care professionals and specific aspects ofhealth care provision. See, 
e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Joint Commission on Accreditation of 
Hospitals: Private Regulation of Health Care and the Public Interest, 24 
B.C. L. REv. 835 (1983); Steve P. Calandrillo, Physician-Assisted 
Suicide Under Managed Care, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 72 (1998). 
122. See, e.g., Daniel L. Goelzer & Susan Ferris Wyderko, Rule 2(E): 
Securities and Exchange Commission Discipline ofProfessionals, 85 Nw. 
U. L. REV. 652 (1991). 
123. See, e.g., Webb, supra note 83, at 42. 
124. Private Environmental Regulation, supra note 2, at 66 (describing 
the AF&PA's decision to employ a voluntary logger training program, 
TBTs on grounds that they seek to differentiate among simi­
lar products based on how they are produced. Since the pri­
mary targets of the treaties are governments, some observers 
question whether nongovernmental certification organiza­
tions should be covered at all. The TBT amendments do ap­
ply to "recognized bodies"; however, this term is not de­
fined in the treaty. 128 Kernaghan Webb concludes that an or­
ganization like the ISO, with its designated national stan­
dards bodies, shoUld be viewed as a recognized body, but 
that groups like the FSC should not. This makes some sense, 
but is also vulnerable based on the analysis of the paper thus 
far. "Recognition" could be given either a broad or a narrow 
interpretation. On the broad side, even forbearance from 
regulating based on an assessment that a certification pro­
gram is performing acceptably could be viewed as recogni­
tion. On the narrow side, the WTO could conclude that un­
less a government explicitly delegates authority to regulate 
in a field to a certification program, it is not a recognized 
program. This is another area that will bear watching. The 
effects of the WTO on domestic legal incorporation of cer­
tification programs could be quite significant in years to 
come. And of course, if the WTO is treated as a form of 
legal system even though it is not a nation state, we must 
ask the question to what degree it incorporates certifica­
tion programs. 
V. Conclusions 
A. Patterns of Legal Incorporation 
Certification programs are natural targets for incorporation 
by legal systems because they have elements of formality, 
continuity, and institutionalization that other, ostensibly 
one-shot industry initiatives may not have, and also because 
they reduce the costs of deliberation and enforcement for le­
gal bodies. Although the incorporation of environmental 
certification programs into U.S. law is only beginning to un­
fold, the analysis in Sections III and IV suggests that it is oc­
curring, mostly through indirect legal processes. Yet the 
process of legal incorporation is very difficult to monitor. 
On the one hand, it can occur in so many small steps simulta­
neously in so many avenues that it is very difficult to trace. It 
can go forward almost unnoticed. On the other hand, there is 
a tension between the quasi-legal analysis performed above 
and empirical �ssess�ent. The facts that the forms of incor-
rather than a requirement that all suppliers be certified in sustainable 
forestry methods). 
125. See Swankin, supra note 1 19, at 32. 
126. Their primary effects have been on so-called buyers groups, which 
are groups of wholesalers and retailer who jointly commit to buy only 
certified products. These groups have evidently been constrained in 
various ways by trade laws, but no published information has been found 
that explains how. 
127. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, supra note 1 14, at 6-7. 
128. Annex I of the TBT Amendments defines "standard" as a "document 
approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated 
use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes 
and production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory." !d. at 
157. 
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poration described above can occur, and are occurring, do 
not by themselves demonstrate that a widespread change is 
taking place. They indicate that larger changes may be oc­
curring, though, and that it is appropriate to inquire further. 
B. Implications 
One of the primary reasons legal incorporation of certifica­
tion is interesting is that it may signal larger shifts in social 
governance structures. The challenge is to grasp the dimen­
sions of the change that are likely to be most important. To 
date, most analysis has focused on· questions 'such as 
whether voluntary environmental programs yield environ­
mental performance better than would have occurred other­
wise, and whether they improve cost-effectiveness. Al­
though the answers vary with specific cases, they seem to in­
cline toward a cautious "yes."129 Provided certain safe­
guards are present, such as transparency and watchdog 
groups with the ability to monitor activities, environmental 
and efficiency gains can be achieved. 130 And, of course, the 
· fact that these gains are possible may be what impels the 
establishment of certification systems and other 
nongovernmental initiatives in the first place. 
Yet, other dimensions of change may be equally or 
more important. For example, the proliferation and 
institutionalization of certification systems may signal a 
general shift in political power from some actors to others. 
Who exactly is gaining and losing power? Cutler, Haufler, 
and Porter, who have studi ed the growth o f  
nongovernmental authority in a number of sectors, conclude 
that traditional nation states are clearly losing ground, while 
corporate industrial interests are gaining. 131 They argue that 
this shift is bringing a diminution of public participation and 
accountability. 132 In their even more expansive ·study, 
Braithwaite and Drahos agree that many nation states are 
losing ground to corporations and self-regulatory organiza­
tions in the emerging global regulatory system.133 They see 
the system as fluid and highly variable, however, depending 
on the particular area of regulation and problem. Actors pur­
sue their agendas in significant part by hashing out guiding 
principles, and even relatively small-scale players encoun-
129. See, e.g., VOLUNTARY APPROACHES IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
(Carlo Carraro & Francois Leveque eds., 1999). See also the papers 
collected at Second CAVA Workshop on the Efficiency of Voluntary 
. Approaches to Environmental Policy, at http://www.akf.dk/cavalwp.htm 
(last visited Nov. 28, 2000). 
130. VoLUNTARY APPROACHES IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supra note 
129, at 10. 
1 3 1 .  PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 369-70 (A. 
Claire Cutler et al. eds., 1999). 
132. Jd. 
...  
133. JoHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS 
REGULATION (2000). They see the United States and the European Union, 
however, as still the most powerful actors in the global regulatory system. 
134. It is important to note, however, that many certification programs 
incorporate and build on legal requirements, often making it more likely 
that they will be met. Therefore their legitimacy cannot be treated as 
entirely separate from government authority. 
135. Important exceptions include Cashore, supra note 6, and PRIVATE 
ter a surprising number of strategic opportunities to affect 
the system. Nonetheless, the overall pattern is one of in­
creasing control by large, powerful actors, working as often 
through private governance processes as through state ones. 
The growth of a global regulatory system relying 
heavily on nongovernmental regulation also raises impor­
tant questions about the nature of political legitimacy, and 
whether it might be changing. Received social theory holds 
that to survive governance systems must establish signifi­
cant claims to legitimacy with the public. For perhaps two 
centuries governments have enjoyed a virtual monopoly on 
legitimate regulatory authority. How then do 
nongovernmental environmental regulatory systems estab­
lish and maintain legitimacy? One possibility, of course, is 
that they don't, because people simply do not understand 
how they work or how important they are. While this is true 
of some systems, which pretend to seek transparency while 
thwarting it in practice, it is not true of all of them. The ones 
reviewed in the research underlying this paper seem to be 
moving on the whole toward increased transparency. More­
over, they seem to enjoy growing public legitimacy and 
great confidence that it will continue to grow. It is therefore 
important to ask whether a new form of legitimacy may be 
emerging,· one that is not based primarily on political pro­
cesses managed by government.134 If so, perhapsjt is based 
on the certification systems' peculiar combination of com­
mitments to laudable but diffuse goals, high expertise, se­
lective stakeholder participation, and independence from 
government. Plausible or not, this kind ofhypothesis has re­
ceived only the most preliminary exploration to date.135 If 
nongovernmental environmental certification systems 
flourish, such questions will have to be addressed.136 
Fourth, as suggested above, voluntary agreements, 
certification programs, and legal incorporation may and 
perhaps should be seen in connection to larger develop­
ments in society. There has been a certain amount of work 
attempting to make such linkages to government legal insti­
tutions. Some approaches focus more on discursive pro­
cesses in society, 137 while others focus on organizational 
structures and patterns of relationships.138 The next step is to 
AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 1 3 1 .  Private 
Authority and International Affairs focuses primarily on Weberian 
authority structures, which are probably more closely linked to nation 
states than is optimal for understanding the certification systems described 
here. Cashore focuses on generic modes of establishing and maintaining 
legitimacy, which are available to all types of networked social 
organizations, including certification systems. 
136. It should also be noted that the question of legitimacy plagues both 
private certification systems and supranational governmental entities, 
such as the WTO and the European Union, which also stand in some 
tension with nation states. See, e.g., Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic 
Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of Supranationalism: The 
Example of the European Community, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 628 (1999). 
137. See, e.g., Teubner, supra note 25. 
1 38. See, e.g., David M. Trubek et al., Global Restructuring and the Law: 
Studies of the Internationalization of Legal Fields and the Creation of 
Transnational Arenas, 44 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 407 (1994) (emerging 
systemic relationships, particularly the growth of a global trading order, 
may drive changes in both private and public legal orders). 
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extend those theoretical constructs to nongovernmental reg­
ulatory systems, and to adapt them as appropriate. 
Finally, it may be time to revisit the meaning of"law" 
and "legal system." As the discussion of international trade 
law suggested, the role of the nation state and state-based 
law is becoming increasingly problematical. It is being chal­
lenged from one side by the growth of a global trading sys­
tem with an accompanying transnational legal system, and 
from the other by the growth of nongovernmental, often 
global regulatory mechanisms such as the certification sys­
tems. Yet the two supposedly defining characteristics of cer­
tification systems, their privateness and their voluntariness, 
are highly contingent. They are under serious threat as a re­
sult of the linkages of certification systems to national and 
transnational legal systems. They could turn into their oppo­
sites before we really notice it. If so, perhaps they were not 
what they seemed. 
Appendix 
Examples of Forest Stewardship 
Council Principles and Standards 
The Forest Stewardship Principles and Criteria, applicable 
around the world, are as follows139: 
1 .  Forest management shall respect all applicable laws of 
the country in which they occur, and international treaties 
and agreements to which the country is a signatory, and 
comply with all FSC Principles and Criteria. 
2. Long-term tenure and use rights to the land. and forest 
resources shall be clearly defined, documented, and le­
gally established. 
3. The legal and customary rights of indigenous peoples to 
own, use, and manage their lands, territories, and resources 
shall be recognized and respected. 
4. Forest management operations shall maintain or enhance 
the long-term social and economic well-being of forest 
workers and local communities. 
5 .  Forest management operations shall encourage the effi­
cient use of the forest's multiple products and services to en­
sure economic viability and a wide range of environmental 
and social benefits. 
6. Forest management shall conserve biological diversity 
and its associated values, water resources, soils, and 
unique and fragile ecosystems and landscapes, and, by so 
doing, maintain the ecological functions and the integrity 
of the forest. 
139. FSC Website, supra note 2. 
140. Canadian Maritime Regional Initiative of the Canadian FSC 
7. A management plan-appropriate to the scale and inten­
sity of the operations-shall be written, implemented, and 
kept up to date. The long-term objectives of management, 
and the means of achieving them, shall be clearly stated. 
8. Monitoring shall be conducted-appropriate to the scale 
and intensity of forest management-to assess the condi­
tion of the forest, yields of forest products, chain of cus­
tody, management activities, and their social and environ­
mental impacts. 
9. Management activities in high conservation value forests 
shall maintain or enhance the attributes that define such 
forests. Decisions regarding high conservation value for­
ests shall always be considered in the context of a precau­
tionary approach. 
10. Plantations shall be planned and managed in accordance 
withPrinciples andCriteria 1 -9, and Principle 10 andits Cri­
teria. While plantations can provide an array of social and 
economic benefits, and can contribute to satisfying the 
world's needs for forest products, they should complement 
the management of, reduce pressures on, and promote the 
restoration and conservation of natural forests. 
Exemplifying the countless standards and indicators imple­
menting the principles and criteria are those of the Canadian 
Maritime Region regarding biodiversity that were promul­
gated as a regional application of Principle 6 above140: 
6.2 • Safeguards shall exist which protect rare, threat­
ened, and endangered species and their habitats (e.g. 
nesting and feeding areas). Conservation zones and pro­
tection areas, appropriate to the scale and intensity of 
forest management and the uniqueness of the affected re­
sources, shall be established. Inappropriate hunting, 
fishing, trapping and collecting shall be controlled. 
6.2.1 • Threatened and endangered species (listed by 
provincial and federal endangered species legislation) 
and their habitat must be protected or managed in ac­
cordance with approved recovery plans. Where recov­
ery plans are not yet approved, disturbance of known 
occurrences of such species is to be avoided and a cau­
tionary approach taken to protect their habitat. Forest 
owner/manager activities must ensure that species 
that are rare, vulnerable or under investigation by 
COSEWIC [Committee on the Status of Endangered 
Wildlife in Canada], or their provincial equivalents as 
designated by recognized authorities (e.g. academic 
experts, provincial or  national museums or 
COSEWIC) are not further threatened by timber or 
non-timber activities. 
Indicators: 
Areas are inventoried for such species before harvest­
ing, stand improvement or road-building activities 
are carried out (appropriate to the scale and intensity 
of the operation). Protection of such species is ad­
dressed in the management plan. Known occurrences 
of such species and their habitat are not disturbed. 
Working Group, Certification Standards for Best Forestry Practices in 
the Maritime Forestry Region, at http://www.web.net/fscca/standard. 
htm#anchor79303 (visited 12/17 /00). 
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Forest workers are aware of known occurrences of 
such species and are following the management plan 
with respect to protecting such species and their habi­
tat. Management staff is aware of those species that 
may occur locally. 
6.2.2 * Old growth stands must not be harvested. 
Indicators: 
Inventories are carried out to identify old growth 
stands (appropriate to the scale and intensity of the 
operation). Old growth stands are identified on 
management plan maps. No evidence ofharvesting 
old growth stands exists. Management and forest 
workers are aware of the characteristics of old 
growth stands. 
6.2.3 • Areas with unusually high native species or eco­
system diversity must be identified, and protected or 
managed in such a way as to ensure that the diversity is 
not lost. 
Indicators: 
Management has identified areas with unusually high 
native species or ecosystem diversity using the latest 
regional methodology, formulae, and/or techniques 
(e.g. those used by WWF, Greater Fundy Ecosystem 
Research Group or New Brunswick Nature Trust). 
Such areas are identified on management plan maps. 
Management plans detail measures to ensure the di­
versity of such sites is not lost. Forest workers are fol­
lowing the management plan measures to ensure the 
diversity of such sites is not lost. 
